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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-EQUAL PROTECTION-MISCEGENATION STATUTE DEUNCONSTITUTIONAL-Petitioners, a female white and a male Negro, applied to respondent, county clerk of Los Angeles County, for a marriage license.
Respondent refused to issue the license, relying on sections 60 and 69 of the California Code.1 Petitioners brought a mandamus proceeding to compel respondent
to issue the license, contending that the statutes relied on by respondent were
unconstitutional in that they prohibited the free exercise of their religion.2 Held,
in a four to three decision, the statute is unconstitutional. Three justices of the
majority found that the statute violated the equal protection clause of the United
States Constitution and was too vague and uncertain to be enforcible. A fourth
justice found an unconstitutional interference with religious freedom. Perez v.
Lippold, (Cal. 1948) 198 P. (2d) 17.3
Twenty-nine states, besides California, have statutes prohibiting marriage
because of racial difference. 4 Such statutes withstood so many attacks on their
constitutionality in the latter part of the last century5 that their validity under the
state police power had come to be taken as a matter of course.6 Regulation of
marriage has always been considered a proper function of the state.7 The minority
of the court relies strongly on the rule that all presumptions favor constitutionality
of a legislative enactment and that a statute should not be disturbed if any constitutional basis can be found. Following the lead of earlier cases, the minority would
classify the statute under attack with statutes prohibiting incestuous or bigamous
marriages. In order to so classify miscegenation statutes, courts have found that
they involve no racial discrimination because they apply equally to both races.8
CLARED

1 Calif. Civil Code (1941) § 60: "All marriages of white persons with Negroes, Mongolians, members of the Malay race, or mulattoes are illegal and void." Calif. Civil Code
(1941) § 69: " .•• no license may be issued authorizing the marriage of a white person
with a Negro, mulatto, Mongolian or member of the Malay race."
2 Petitioners, both members of the Roman Catholic Church, maintainea that since their
church had no rule forbidding interracial marriage they were entitled to receive the sacrament
of matrimony.
3 Review by the United States Supreme Court is precluded by the rules of that Court,
since the case became moot when a marriage license was issued to the original petitioners.
4 For an analysis of the statutes, see 1 VERNIER, AMErucAN FAMILY LAws, § 44 (1931);
MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS oF THE NEGRO, c. IO (1940); 32 CAL. L. REv. 269 (1944).
5 In re Hobbs, 12 Fed. Cas. No. 6550 (C.C. Ga. 1871); State v. Gibson, 36 Ind. 389,
IO Am. Rep. 42 (1871); State v. Jackson, 80 Mo. 175, 50 Am.Rep. 499 (1883). Burns v.
State, 48 Ala. 195, 17 Am.Rep. 34 (1872), apparently the ouly contrary decision, was
directly overruled five years later in Green v. State, 58 Ala. 190, 29 Am.Rep. 739 (1877).
6 See 8 R.C.L. 349 (1915); 36 AM. Jun., p. 452 Miscegenation § 3 (1941).
7 Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 8 S.Ct. 723 (1888); Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343,
68 S.Ct. 1087 (1948).
s The United States Supreme Court has never passed directly on the question involved
in the principal case. However, in considering an Alabama statute which imposed a more
severe penalty for adultery when the parties were a white person and a Negro, the Court found
no discrimination because both races and both participants were treated alike. Pace v. Alabama, 106 U.S. 583, 1 S.Ct. 637 (1883). The minority also relied on Re Paquet's Estate,
101 Ore. 393, 200 P. 911 (1921), in which a statute declaring marriages between white
persons and Indians void was found non-discriminatory.

1949]

RECENT DECISIONS

835

The majority of the court refuses to accept such reasoning, pointing out that the
rights protected by the equal protection clause are the rights of individuals, not of
racial groups; inasmuch as the statute under attack prohibits an individual from
marrying the person of his choice on the basis of his race it is certainly discriminatory. 9 Once it is determined that the statute does involve racial discrimination,
recent decisions of the United States Supreme Court indicate that the legislation
must be subjected to the most rigid scrutiny with no presumption of validity. 10
The majority view in the principal case would seem to require that any statutory
discrimination based on race alone be designed to meet a clear and present danger
arising out of an emergency.11 Since miscegenation statutes are surely not drawn
to meet an emergency, a finding of discrimination must amount to a finding of
unconstitutionality under this criterion. Even assuming that discriminatory racial
classification can be valid under the equal protection clause in the absence of an
emergency, the majority would still require exceptional circumstances to justify
such legislation.12 In weighing respondent's arguments in favor of the statute, the
majority finds no exceptional circumstances to justify it.13

Donald D. Davis

9 In Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. I, 68 S.Ct. 836 (1948), it was urged that since the
courts enforced restrictive covenants excluding white persons, there was no denial of equal
protection of the laws in enforcing covenants excluding Negroes. In rejecting this contention
and holding the state's enforcement invalid, the Court, id. at 22, said: "Equal protection of the
laws is not achieved through indiscriminate imposition of inequalities."
10 "It should be noted, to begin with, that all legal restrictions which curtail the civil
rights of a single racial group are innnediately suspect. That is not to say that all such restrictions are unconstitutional, It is to say that courts must subject them to the most rigid scrutiny.
Pressing public necessity may sometimes justify the existence of such restrictions; racial
antagonism never can." Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 at 216, 65 S.Ct. 193
(1944). See also notes 11 and 12, infra.
11 The court cites Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U.S. 81, 63 S.Ct. 1375 (1943).
Wartime emergency was there found sufficient to justify the Japanese curfew.
1 2 See Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633, 68 S.Ct. 269 (1948), where the Court found
unconstitutional certain statutory presumptions in the California Alien Land Law.
13 Respondent attempted to justify the legislation on the grounds that the white race was
physically, mentally and socially superior, and that the miscegenation statute promoted public
peace by preventing race conHicts.

